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Abstract:
The bulk of the federally allocated revenue derived from revenue accruing to the Federal Government of Nigeria is
shared with the other two tiers of government under a revenue allocation system (RAS) using different formulas at
different times. The sharing principle has remained a contentious issue to date. This paper presents a spatio-temporal
analysis of three items of revenue allocation namely, statutory, excess crude oil, value added tax and 13% share of
derivation shared among the three tiers between May 1999 – December 2008. A comparative analysis was conducted
among 6 geo-political zones, 36 states and 774 local government areas of the country. The result shows that when
allocations from the four items of revenue are combined, the South-South zone leads with incredible margin, thus
raising questions about the legitimacy of agitations from this zone.
Introduction:
Federalism was adopted in 1954 in Nigeria as a political device to try to keep
together diverse large ethnic groups that could have otherwise remained contiguous as
neighbouring nation-states. Thus, the distribution of federally collected revenue came into
being under conditions of ethnic plurality and rivalry.  In recent years, the issues of
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resource control, revenue allocation and fiscal federalism have dominated discussions at
various levels of Nigeria’s political debate.  Like most federal systems, Nigeria has a
revenue distribution system in which the federal government shares revenue with the
states and local governments. As far back as the early 1970s, the bulk of federally
allocated revenue derive from revenue accruing to the federal government  which is then
shared with the other two tiers of government under a revenue allocation system (RAS)
using different formulas at different times.
At different times, ad hoc commissions have been set up to determine the
allocation formulae and criteria. Between 1946 and 1979, there were eight of such
commissions on revenue allocation. These were: Phillipson- 1946, Hicks-Phillipson-
1951, Chick- 1953, Raisman- 1958, Binns- 1964, Dina- 1968, Aboyade- 1977, and
Okigbo- 1980. It was not until 1988 that a permanent body was created to monitor,
review, and advise the federal government on RAS on a continuing basis. The new body,
called the National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission, represents
a structured attempt to replace the ad hoc approaches to effecting changes in the RAS.
This body is enshrined in the 1989 Constitution.
Despite these efforts, revenue allocation has remained a contentious issue among
the three tiers of government in Nigeria. In the last eight years, the 36 state governments
have been at daggers-drawn with the Federal Government over the formulation of a
revenue sharing formula that would be acceptable to all the stakeholders.  One major
impact of this seemingly never ending controversy is the fact that fiscal federalism in
Nigeria has not been able to contribute optimally to social and economic development.
Despite the considerable increase in the number of administrative units, the rate of real
economic growth has been low and the country’s per capita income has declined
considerably over the years compared with the level that was attained in the 1980s. As the
nation operates a new era of democracy under a federal constitution, there is the need to
critically review the division of functions among the various tiers of governments, as well
as the revenue sharing arrangements in order to substantially improve the delivery of
public goods and services as well as promote real economic growth.
The available literature on revenue allocation in Nigeria focuses mostly on
justifying a particular sharing formula or proposing a new one. Notable among this
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category are: Adedotun (1991) and Mobolaji (2002, 2004). Other studies including
Anyanwu (1999), Aigbokhan (1999), Ebajemito and Abudu (1999), Okon and Egbon
(1999), seem to discuss generally about fiscal federalism by diagnosing the Nigeria
situation and proffering solutions. Some of the immediate puzzling issues that need to be
examined critically include the following:
 Is it really the sharing formula that is the problem or the proper
management and effective utilization of the allocated revenue that matter?
 Is the existing revenue allocation formula adequate or is there room for
further refinements in view of the various formulae that have been tried out
thus far?
The paper therefore aims at providing answers to these immediate questions as
well as serving as a platform for raising a number of other secondary issues as basis for
further research into areas that are likely to be of great interest for policy analysis and
development planning.
Before May 1999, revenue allocation figures among the three tiers of government
had always been shrouded in secrecy. Now, in order to entrench transparency and
accountability at all levels of government, the monthly allocation figures are made public.
It is also believed that revenue allocation, if made available in a user-friendly format and
carefully analyzed, are capable of enhancing greater accountability and good governance.
This study, therefore, seeks to focus on utilizing available data on monthly
allocation figures from 1999 to 2008 to investigate deeply into some problems of fiscal
federalism and revenue allocation by allowing the data on revenue allocation to tell their
own story. No concerted efforts had been made in the past to study the size, distribution
and trend in the revenue allocation across geopolitical zones, states and local government
areas. In fact, there is a dearth of literature on the issue of comparative analysis of
economic indicators among the federating units in Nigeria. Our study aims at rectifying
these shortcomings in the literature.
In addition, this study stimulates the consciousness of the ordinary citizen; to raise
questions about the way and manner such allocations are spent. This will make political
debates lively and create a challenge to political office holders to account for allocations
received during their tenure in office. The choice of May 1999 is highly significant as it
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marked the inauguration of the third republic and it is widely believed that never before
then had government at all levels had so much funds at their disposal.
Following the background, the rest of this paper is structured as follows: section
two below provides a conceptual survey of past empirical studies on fiscal federalism and
revenue allocation; section three presents an overview of revenue allocation system in
Nigeria between 1999 and 2008, with section four’s focus on the comprehensive
comparative analysis of the revenue allocation the three main tier of Federal Republic of
Nigeria;  section five gives the geographical context to the debate using the
instrumentality of geographic information system(GIS) to show how the  revenue were
allocated to the geo-political zones in Nigeria, while section six concludes the paper.
A survey of the Empirical Evidence:
A large number of studies have been conducted on fiscal federalism and revenue
allocation both in the developed and developing countries. However, the focus of majority
of these studies usually revolves around examining the structure, pattern, trends and
impact analysis of revenue allocation on economic growth. Examples that can be cited of
these studies are many.  Tables 1 and 2 below summarise some of the concepts of these
studies in other countries and in Nigeria respectively.
Table.1: Summary of empirical studies on other countries
Authors Countries Period Main results
Davoodi and
Zou (1998)
46 Developing
and Developed
Countries
1970-1989
five and ten
year averages
10% higher decentralization of
spending reduces growth of real
GDP per capita in developing
countries by 0.7-0.8%-points
(10%significance level)
Woller and
Philipps
(1998)
23 Developing
Countries
1974-1991
three and five
year averages
and annual data
No robust significant effect of the
decentralization of spending or
revenue on growth of real GDP per
capita
Yilmaz
(2000)
17 Unitary States
13 Federal
1971-1990
annual data
Decentralization of expenditures at
the local level increases growth of
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Countries
Newly
Industrialized
Countries
and Developed
Countries
real GDP per capita in unitary states
more than in federal countries.
Decentralization at the regional level
is not significant
Enikolopov
and
Zhuravskaya
(2003)
21 Developed
and 70
Developing
and
Transition
Countries
Cross-section
of the averages
1975-2000
10% higher decentralization of
revenue reduces growth of real GDP
per capita in developing countries by
0.14%points (5% significance level)
Thießen
(2003)
21 Developed
Countries
Cross-section
of the averages
1973-1998
Decentralization of spending by
10% increases growth of real GDP
per capita by 0.15%-points (5%
significance  level), quadratic term
is significantly negative
Thießen
(2003a)
26 Countries Panel data
1981-1995
Decentralization of spending by
10% increases growth of  real GDP
per capita by 0.12%-points (5%
significance level).
Zhang and
Zou
(1998)
28 Chinese
Provinces
1987-1993
Annual
Data
Decentralization of expenditure to
the provinces reduces growth of real
GDP per capita
Jin, Qian and
Weingast
(1999)
29 Chinese
Provinces
1982-1992
Annual
Data
Expenditure decentralization by
10% increases growth of real GDP
per capita by 1.6%points (10%
significance level)
Lin and Liu
(2000)
28 Chinese
Provinces
1970-1993
Annual
Data
Revenue decentralization by 10%
increases growth of real GDP per
capita by 2.7%points (5%
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significance level)
Qiao,
Martinez
Vazquez and
Yu (2002)
28 Chinese
Provinces
1985-1998 Expenditure decentralization
increases growth of nominal GDP
per capita significantly (5%
significance level)
Naumets
(2003)
24 Ukrainian
Oblasts and
Autonomous
Republic of
Crimea
1998-2000 Not robust negative impact of own
revenue decentralization on growth
of real gross value added
Xie, Zou and
Davoodi
(1999)
Central Level
in the USA
1951-1992 No significant impact of expenditure
decentralization on
growth of real GDP per capita
Akai and
Sakata
(2002)
50 US
States
1992-1996,
Cross-Section
of Average
Growth Rates,
Panel with
Annual Data
Expenditure decentralization by
10% increases growth of GDP per
capita by 1.6-3.2%points (robust
10% significance levels)
Berthold,
Drews and
Thode
(2001)
16 Lander 1991-1998 Higher horizontal and vertical grants
significantly reduce
growth of nominal GDP per capita
Behnisch,
Büttner and
Stegarescu
(2002)
Central Level in
Germany
1950-1990 Increase of federal share of
expenditure in total expenditure has
positive effect on German
productivity growth
Source: Compiled by the authors
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Table.2: Summary of studies on the Nigerian fiscal federalism
Authors Objectives Findings
Akinlo
(1999)
To examine the fiscal
responsiveness of
State governments to formal
intergovernmental flows in
aggregate and according to
the type of central
government assistance
schemes.
The most important finding is that state
governments’ Fiscal expenditure was
stimulated by federal grants during the
period of analysis. More importantly
various grants examined were found to
have positive effects on the expenditure
profiles of the state governments. Above
all, statutory grants appear to account for
the most stimulative effect of federal funds
on total state governments’ capital and
recurrent expenditure.
Aigbokhan
(1999)
To investigate the fiscal
decentralization on economic
growth in Nigeria
The study found evidence of high
concentration ratio of both expenditure and
revenue. It also found evidence of
mismatch in spending and taxing
responsibilities with states being harder hit.
Akujuobi and
Kalu,(2009)
Examining the role of the
financing sources of Nigerian
State governments in the
financing of their real asset
investments.
It can be seen that Federal allocation and
stabilization fund are significant in the
financing of real asset investments at both
5% and 1% levels of significance.
Internally-generated revenue (IGR), loans
(LNS), Grants (GT) and value added tax
(VAT) are found insignificant in the
financing of the real asset investments of
Nigerian state governments for the period
1984-2008. Instead of through the external
sources stated earlier.
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Jimoh,
(2003)
(i) To provide concrete
statistical evidence on the
impact of the extent of
decentralization of
government expenditures
and/or revenue collection on
the levels of economic
activities in Nigeria.
(ii) To examine the extent to
which varying degree of
decentralization of
expenditures and/or revenue-
raising powers have affected
the Nigerian performance on
key measures of
development.
The regression analysis suggests that more
decentralized governance, especially in
terms of increased local governments and
increased transfer of revenues to lower
tiers of government would stimulate
economic activities and/ or economic
growth. It also suggests that the major
determinants of the prevalence of poverty
in Nigeria are economic and population
growths.
Source: Compiled by the authors
Analysis of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria (1999 – 2008)
Revenue and resource allocation issue in Nigeria present a strong idiosyncrasy
from other economies of the world basically in terms of sharing formula most especially
between the central and its constituent units. At such, it continues to remain a serious
political issue till date. This situation can largely be attributed to diverse and complex
multidimensional factors, of which heterogeneity of the people greatly contributed to. For
example there are as many ethnic groups (apart from the major tribes) as there are
different religious sects with various ideological leanings.
In the light of the above, it is understandable why the issue of resource allocation
continue to generate political debates and intense discussions in various local and
international fora. However, most of these discussions lacked intellectual and statistical
evidence. Rather, they are mere political sentiments. Therefore, this section x-rays the
dimension and direction of the federal government allocation to the different tiers of
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governance and various geo-political zones in Nigeria in the period spanning 116 months,
that is, May 1999 through December 2008.
The choice of the starting period of May 1999 is symbolic and significant. It
marked the inauguration of the third republic and it is widely believed that never before
then had government at all levels had so many funds at their disposal. Again, before this
period, allocation figures were shrouded in topmost secrecy. It was during this period that
agitation for accountability and transparency in public finance became vociferous. As a
way of demonstrating sensitivity, government started making the allocations available
online. Consequently, the entire data for the study period were downloaded freely from
the website of the Federal Ministry of Finance .
However, the free accessibility goes with a number of challenges some of which
include:
 data not available in an easily convertible format;
 duplication or outright missing of allocation data either for some months or
for some levels of government;
 inconsistencies in data arising from computational errors and tabulation;
and,
 Lack of definitions and formulae for the various items of revenue and
deductions.
Notwithstanding the identified lapses, the data set still provided reasonable degree
of accuracy needed for meaningful inference.
The Federal Allocation Data
The monthly allocation data are generally presented in four different tables. The
first gives the summary of the allocations to the three tiers (FGN, States and LGCs)
including the 13% derivation fund for three different items of revenue which include
statutory, excess crude oil and VAT. A further breakdown of the distribution of the
allocation to FGN, state governments and LGCs are presented in second, third and fourth
tables respectively. The tables also reflect items of deduction such as external debt,
contractual obligation, and ‘other deductions’. The other deductions cover National Water
Rehabilitation Projects, National Agricultural Technology Support Programme, Recovery
of Debt owed to FIRS (WHT & VAT), Payment for Fertilizer, State Water Supply
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Project, State Agricultural Project, National Fadama Project and Repayment to NEPA.
Therefore, there are basically, four items of revenue allocation and three items of
deduction. These are itemized in table 4.
Table 3: Items of Revenue Allocation and Deductions
Items of Revenue Allocation
1. Statutory
2. Excess Crude Oil
3. Value Added Tax (VAT)
4. 13% Share of Derivation
Items of Deductions
External Debt
Contractual Obligation
Other Deductions
Comparative Analysis of Allocation to the Three Tiers
A comparative analysis of the observed allocation reflects the sharing formula as
shown in figures 1, 2 and 3. In the case of statutory allocation, it can be seen that federal
government had the highest allocation of about N9.48 trillion with all the states had N4.77
trillion while LGCs had 3.76 trillion under the period of review. A total of 1.960 trillion
was allocated as 13% derivation fund from statutory allocation. Similarly, the excess
crude oil sharing shows FG raking N1.536 trillion, states N1.049 trillion and LGCs N901
billion. A total of N377 billion was allocated as 13% derivation fund from excess crude
oil allocation. The States had a good share of VAT allocation which amounted to N880
billion. They are followed by the LGCs with a figure of N560.8 billion while FGN had
N240 billion.
Fig 1 Fig.2
N377.81b (9.775%)
N1.536tr (39.76%)
N901.6564b (23.33%)
N1.049tr (27.14%)
13% Derivation Fund
FGN
LGC
STATE
MAY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2008
EXCESS CRUDE OIL ALLOCATION TO THE THREE TIES
9.815% (N1.960tr)
47.46% (N9.4781tr)18.81% (N3.757tr)
23.91% (N4.774tr)
13%
Derivation
Fund
FGN
LGC
STATE
MAY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2008
STATUTORY  ALLOCATION TO THE THREE TIES
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Fig.3
The most remarkable feature of these three items of revenue allocation is the
observed skewness in their distribution. In other words, the distribution is inequitable.
While statutory and excess crude oil apparently favoured FG, States benefited more from
VAT. What this suggests is that the federal government is well positioned financially with
huge fund at its disposal. The lopsidedness in the revenue allocation is the genesis of the
socio-economic and political problems being experienced in the country. The extent of
this unevenness is displayed in fig. 4 and fig. 5 below. Looking at the average monthly
statutory allocation to each of the three tiers of government, it can be observed that the
gap between the federal and state governments in Nigeria is very wide whereas the gap
between states and local governments are also wide but not as wide as that of federal
government. A number of commentators have attributed this phenomenon as the basis for
the massive corruption at the federal level.
15.01% (N240.3456b)
35.02%
(N560.8063b)
49.97% (N880.22b)
FGN
LGCs
STATEs
MAY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2008
VAT ALLOCATION TO THE THREE TIES
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A different picture emerges from the average monthly allocation of VAT proceeds
to all the sharing units. The proceeds are normally shared to FG, States and LGAs at 15%,
50% and 35% respectively. The available data for the period under study truly reflect this.
The mean of VAT allocation between the states and the federal government are far apart
European Scientific Journal                  December edition vol. 7, No.26 ISSN: 1857 - 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
194
but the distance between the local and the state governments was not as wide as that of
federal government.
The distinguishing feature between the three allocations is that the amount
involved in the case of statutory and excess crude oil is substantially higher, in fact in
multiple folds than that of VAT allocation. It is also interesting to note that within the
period of review-beginning from May 1999 to December 2008, the rate and level of
growth in the trends of movement of the amount involved in the statutory allocation has
been consistently higher and rising over time except for the sharp decline in the late 2008.
(See fig. 6 below). The drop was as a result of militancy in the Niger Delta area and the
global economic downturn.
Comparative Analysis of Revenue Allocation to the Geo-Political Zones
From geo-political zones perspective, North-West zone had the highest statutory
allocation of N1.041 trillion, immediately followed by North-Central with N950.47
billion over the period of review. In this analysis Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was
treated as part of North-Central zone thus having seven states. The least allocation goes to
the South-East with N612.101 billion during the same period. The difference between
0
50
100
150
200Stat.
Allo
c in
Bn
(N)
Jan1999 Jul2001 Jan2004 Jul2006 Jan2009date
May 1999 to December 2008
Fig. 6: TIMEPLOT OF STATUTORY ALLOCATION TO FG
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North-East and South-South zones was not significant when compared to other geo-
political zones. The allocation of VAT across the geo-political zones depicts that there
was no strikingly differences among them. Though, South-Western states had the highest
share of the allocation, followed by North-West zone. In terms of crude oil excess
allocation among the zones, we however noticed markedly difference in the distribution.
For instance, what goes to South-South is highest and substantial compared to other geo-
political zones. The reason for this is obvious being predominantly oil producing region.
The smallest allocation goes to South-East zone with N122.565 billion as depicted on the
diagram. The South-West zone also had about N183.64 billion out of the entire crude oil
excess allocation. The distribution of VAT allocation consistently favoured South-
Western states as depicted on the diagram. The North-West zone also next that of South-
West zone with N153.801 billion. The least collector is South-East zone with N92.834
billion.
The striking feature of the allocations to the geopolitical zones is the performance
of the South-East zone. In all the three items of revenue captured in fig. 7, the zone
recorded the least figures. One plausible reason is that while other zones have six (6)
950.407
124.545166.294
794.992
104.892144.69
1041.95
153.801192.299
612.101
92.834122.565
751.822
133.732
698.933
814.566
216.251183.161
NC NE NW SE SS SW
May 1999 to December 2008
Fig.7: TOTAL ALLOCATION OF STATUTORY CRUDE OIL EXCESS AND VAT TO
GEOPOLITICAL ZONES
Statutory Vat Crude oil Excess
European Scientific Journal                  December edition vol. 7, No.26 ISSN: 1857 - 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
196
states each except North-West and North-Central with seven (7) each, the zone has just 5.
It is not unlikely that if all the zones have equal number of states, say 6, amount shared
might as well be nearly even except in the case of crude oil excess. The point being made
is that the manner or the basis of sharing statutory and VAT among states appear fair and
reasonable.
The 13% derivation fund is mostly benefited by South-South geopolitical zone as
shown in fig. 8 below. The zone received N1.77 trillion out of N1.96 trillion shared
during the period. South-West and South East got N97 billion and N58 billion
respectively thereby showing better performance compared to the remaining three zones
because of the presence of one or two oil producing states in each. A carefull analysis of
the 13% .
Fig. 8
Allocation among the nine oil producing states (see fig. 4.3) shows unequal
distribution. The dominating state is Rivers (N580 billion). Bayelsa (381.7 billion), Akwa
Ibom (381.1) and Delta (379.5) are level players. Edo State came behind with N13.8
billion.
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Fig. 9
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13% Derivation
However, when allocations from the four items of revenue are combined which
now represents the gross allocation, the emerging picture is interesting as shown in
figures. 11 to 14. The stinkinly rich zone is South-South which raked in N3.354 trillion
within the period of study. The gap between it and the zone following is incredibly wide
(about N2 trillion). A critical comparism of the allocation to all the political zones in the
country shows a wide variation in the allocation of the federal generated revenue to all the
political zones in the country, especially covering the period under study (See Figures 11
to 14). This phenomenon generates a number of questions such as: where are all the
monies? Why are all the agitations?
Fig. 10: Map of Nigeria showing the Six (6) Political Zones differentiated with colours
Legend
NIGERIA'S GEO-POLITICAL ZONES
Name
NORTH CENTRAL
NORTH EAST
NORTH WEST
SOUTH EAST
SOUTH SOUTH
SOUTH WEST
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Fig 11 Total Value Added Tax (VAT) Allocation to States in Geo-political Zones
Fig 12 Total Excess Crude Allocation to States in Geo-political Zones
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Fig 13: Total  13% Derivation Allocation to States in Geo-political Zones
Fig 14: Total Revenue Allocation (Statutory, Excess, VAT and 13% Derivatives)  to
States in Geo-political Zones
Conclusion:
The main objective of this paper is to provide a spatial as well as conducting a
detail comparative analysis of revenue allocation in Nigeria from 1999-2008. Though, a
large body of study exists on fiscal federalism and revenue allocation both in the
developed and developing countries, the bulk of these studies focused majorly on issues
bothering on allocation formula rather than analysing allocated figures. To this end, this
project has been able to fill the void by looking at the two objectives using both
Econometric and GIS based approaches. Emanating from the Econometric approach is a
number of interesting outcomes. The results further confirm the findings of earlier studies
on the lopsidedness in the profile of revenue allocation of the Nigerian federation in
favour of the central government to the detriment of its constituent parts. These were
found to be true for statutory allocations and crude oil excesses over the period of review
but with VAT allocation charting a different path.  The States from south-south region got
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the largest percentage in the share of crude oil excesses.  In effect, the distributional
consequences have implications for the growth and development of the constituent units
in particular and the federation in general. A companion paper (Olubusoye and Oyedotun)
describes and details the state by state analysis of the revenue allocation in Nigeria
between 1999 and 2008 when the republic returns to democracy.
Acknowledgement:
This paper is an outcome of a Multidisciplinary Research Project/ Analytical Report
Funded by the MacArthur Foundation Grant, University of Ibadan.
References:
Adedotun O. P. (1991): Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues  Publius,
Vol. 21, No. 4, Federalism in Nigeria: Toward Federal Democracy (Autumn, 1991), pp.
103-111 Published by: Oxford University Press
Aigbokhan B. (1999): Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth in Nigeria, A paper
presented at 1999 Annual Conference of Nigerian Economic Society
Akai, N. and M. Sakata (2002), Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth:
Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States, Journal of Urban
Economics 52, 93 – 108.
Akinlo, A.E. (1999) A Cross-sectional Analysis of the Expenditure Responsiveness of
States to Federal Allocations During Civilian Era in Nigeria- A paper presented at the
1999 annual conference of Nigerian Economic Society.
Akujuobi,L.E and  I.U. Kalu (2009), ‘’State Government Finances and Real Asset
Investments: the Nigerian Experience’’ African Journal of Accounting, Economics,
Finance and Banking Research Vol. 4. No. 4. 2009.
Anyanwu, J.C (1999): Fiscal Relations among the various Tiers of Government in
Nigeria, NES selected paper presented at the 1999 annual conference.
Behnisch, A., T. Büttner and D. Stegarescu (2002), Public Sector Centralization and
Productivity Growth: Reviewing the German Experience, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 02-
03, Mannheim.
Berthold, N., S. Drews and E. Thode (2001), Die föderale Ordnung in Deutschland –
Motor oder Bremse des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums?, Discussion Paper No. 42,
University of Wurzburg 2001.
Davoodi, H. and H. Zou (1998), Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-
Country Study, Journal of Urban Economics 43, 244 – 257.
Ebajemito J.O and Abudu M.J. (1999): Intergovernmental Fiscal relation in a Federal
system: the Nigerian Experience, NES selected paper presented at the 1999 annual
conference.
Enikolopov, R. and E. Zhuravskaya (2003), Decentralization and Political Institutions,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3857, London.
Heywood, I., Cornelius, S., and Carver, S. (2006) An Introduction to Geographical
Information System. Third Edition. Essex England: Person Education Limited.
European Scientific Journal                  December edition vol. 7, No.26 ISSN: 1857 - 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
201
INEC (2006) Nigeria Atlas of Electoral Constituencies. A Publication of Independent
National Electoral Commission.
Jimoh.A (2003) Fiscal Policy and Growth in Africa: Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization
and The Incidence of Taxation. Ad-Hoc Expert Group Meeting, 7-9 October 2003,
UNCC, Addis Ababa
Jin, H., Y. Qian and B.R. Weingast (1999). Regional Decentralization and Fiscal
Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style, Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University.
Kelly.R (1999). Intergovernmental Revenue Allocation Theory and Practice: An
Application to Nepal, Asian Journal of Public Administration Vol 21, No 1 (June 1999)
86-113.
Leonard, W and A. Tamar (2002), Transfer Dependence and Regional Disparities: the
Case of Nigeria. Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform,
Working Paper No. 152.
Lin, J. Y. and Z. Liu (2000), Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China,
Economic Development and Cultural Change 49, 1 – 23.
Martinez-Vazquez, J. and R.M. McNab (2002), Cross-Country Evidence on the
Relationship between Fiscal Decentralization, Inflation, and Growth, in: National Tax
Association (ed.), Proceedings of the 94th Annual Conference on Taxation 2001,
Washington, D.C, 42 – 47.
Mobolaji E. Aluko (2002): Simplifying Our Revenue Allocation Formula Once and For
All. http://www.gamji.com/aluko16.htm
Mobolaji E. Aluko (2004): Revising Nigeria's Revenue Allocation Formula – Aftermath
of a Supreme Court Ruling.http://www.newageonline.com/politics/article01
Okoh, R.N. and P.C. Egbon, 1999. Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation: The
Poverty of the Niger Delta,  in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic Development,
Ibadan Nigeria: The Nigerian Economic Society.
Okon R.N. and Egbon P.C. (1999): Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation: the
Poverty of the Niger Delta, NES selected paper presented at the 1999 annual conference.
Olomola, A. S., (1999), Restructuring Nigeria’s Fiscal system: Rationale, Strategies and
Policies, in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic Development, Ibadan Nigeria: The
Nigerian Economic Society.
Qiao, B., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Y. Xu (2002), Growth and Equity Trade-off  in
Decentralization Policy: China‘s Experience, Georgia State University,
International Studies Programm, Working Paper 02-16, Georgia.
Thießen, U. (2003), Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in High Income
OECD Countries, Fiscal Studies 24, 237 – 274.
Thießen, U. (2003a), Fiscal Federalism in Western European and Selected Other
Countries: Centralization or Decentralization? What Is Better for Economic Growth,
Unpublished Manuscript, DIW Berlin.
Woller, G.M. and K. Phillips (1998), Fiscal Decentralization and LDC Economic Growth:
An Empir ical Investigation, Journal of Development Studies, 34, 139 –148.
Xie, D., H. Zou and H. Davoodi (1999), Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in
the United States, Journal of Urban Economics 45, 228 – 239.
